How the Euro Crisis Evolved and How to Avoid Another: EMU, Fiscal Policy and Credit Ratings* This paper argues that the crisis was an outcome of EMU: setting a common monetary policy for countries with different initial inflation rates. The crisis countries were those with high inflation rates which then had negative real interest rates and consequently over-borrowed. Current policy discussions focus on crisis measures: fiscal, banking and political union, not avoiding another crisis. This paper suggests two ways to avoid a future crisis: offset an inappropriate monetary policy using fiscal policy; markets could better price loan rates by taking into account default risk. The paper shows that neither was done prior to the crisis.
Introduction
The contention of this paper is that the euro crisis originated in the introduction of a single currency which set a common monetary policy for countries with di¤erent initial in ‡ation rates. The expectation was that in ‡ation rates would converge making a single monetary policy for all countries viable. The outcome, however, was that countries with the highest in ‡ation rates -which were also the crisis countries -had too low o¢cial interest rates, negative real rates, rapid output expansion which fuelled continuing higher in ‡ation, and caused a loss of competitiveness compared with low in ‡ation euro countries. Depending on the crisis country, the negative real interest rates and strong economic activity encouraged excessive private or public borrowing which led to banking and debt crises.
¤ This paper was presented at the Bank of Greece conference The Crisis in the Euro Area, Athens, 23-24 May, 2013 The solution proposed by the European Commission (EC) and supported by the European Central Bank (ECB) is to set up a …scal union, a banking union and a political union together with strict (and common) rules on …scal de…cits and sovereign debts. To many this appears to be a high price to pay to ensure the survival of the monetary union. To some it is a roundabout and dirigiste way of achieving political union. To a large extent, however, these are crisis measures, and are not required in normal times. To avoid a future crisis, and hence to obviate the need for such an intrusive solution, far less drastic solutions may su¢ce, as explained in this paper.
In this paper we draw upon previous research of the authors on European Monetary Union (EMU), …scal sustainability and sovereign credit risk (Polito and Wickens (2011 , 2012a , 2012b , 2013a , 2013b and Wickens (2010a Wickens ( , 2010b where a full set of references may also be found) to explore ways to lessen the likelihood of a future crisis. We consider potential …scal and market solutions. If monetary policy is inappropriate, a country needs to use its …scal policy to compensate. This implies that instead of imposing an upper bound on the …scal de…cit that is common to all countries (3% of GDP), it may be necessary to have an even tighter …scal policy than this to o¤set a too loose monetary policy for that country.
It is striking that, following the introduction of the single currency, governments were able to borrow at the same short interest rate. As previously noted, this resulted in negative real interest rates for high in ‡ation countries. Even the private sector was able to borrow at negative real rates in most of the crisis countries. This was also in marked contrast to the much higher market rates that prevailed prior to the introduction of the euro. Signi…cantly, a consequence of the …nancial crisis has been that borrowing rates have returned close to, or above, pre-euro levels due to the market pricing in the risk of default. This suggests that there may be a market solution to the problem of the single currency. Although the ECB is able to set only a single interest rate, the market, by pricing in risk, can set borrowing rates for each country according to their individual economic circumstances. In this way, the market might be able to provide the correct monetary policy for each country. A corollary of this argument is that the euro crisis was less a problem with the euro per se, and more a failure of markets to correctly price default risk or, more generally, to take account of …nancial frictions.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we present evidence in support of our explanation of how the crisis evolved. In Section 3 we examine the …scal stances of EU countries in the build up to the crisis how they worsened afterwards due, in large part, to the decline of GDP. In particular, we consider the extent to which the …scal stance o¤set monetary policy. In Section 4 we suggest a new way to evaluate the …scal stance. This is based on a country's credit rating. Rather than use o¢cial credit ratings, which during the crisis have often appeared to be inappropriate, we use our own estimates of sovereign credit ratings which are based on explicit …scal fundamentals. These credit ratings may be linked to credit spreads and to default swap rates which indicate how markets should adjust borrowing rates above the o¢cial interest rate and thereby apply a correction to o¢cial monetary policy appropriate for individual country circumstances.
The role of EMU in the crisis
It is widely accepted that the euro zone was not an optimal currency area prior to its inception. Of particular signi…cance was the di¤erence in membercountries in ‡ation rates. It was thought that these would converge over time but having a single monetary policy based, in e¤ect, on low German in ‡ation rates prevented this. The consequence was that countries with the highest in ‡ation rates -what turned out in 2008 to be the crisis countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain -suddenly had negative real interest rates. As a result, borrowing increased dramatically. In the case of Greece and Italy this was public borrowing; in the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain it was private borrowing, mainly for real estate. The consequence was that economic activity in the crisis countries was strongly stimulated, in ‡ationary pressures mounted instead of lessened and competitiveness was lost. Meanwhile, given its remit, the ECB was powerless to do anything about this. Indeed, to judge by ECB publications and speeches, the problem seems not even to have been perceived despite being a logical consequence of the New Keynesian model that underpinned ECB monetary policy, see Wickens(2012, ch 14) .
The evolution of national price and output levels before the crisis strongly supports this argument. Selected country price level increases are shown in Figure 1 . As predicted, the crisis countries have much greater increases than Germany. After the crisis price levels ‡atten out in all countries. The e¤ect of the initial conditions prior to the inception of the euro are re ‡ected in Figure 2 in which we plot the average rate of in ‡ation prior to the crisis against their initial rate of in ‡ation in 1999 for all euro countries. There is a very strong positive relation between the two. This provides no support for the convergence of in ‡ation rates; on the contrary, they appear to diverge further. Cumulative output growth for selected countries is shown in Figure 3 . The growth of output in Greece, Ireland and Spain is much stronger than that of Germany. After the crisis output growth is strongly a¤ected by the crisis in these three countries. In Figure 4 we show that prior to the crisis cumulative output growth and price level increases have a strong positive relation for all euro countries. Again, as predicted, in Greece prices increased by 38% and output by 47%, the corresponding numbers for Ireland are 41% and 63%, and for Spain are 44% and 41% while those for Germany are 9% and 16%. Thus, comparing the price levels, Greece lost 29% of its competitiveness against Germany, Ireland 32% and Spain 35%. Not surprisingly these countries experienced growing current account de…cits. The e¤ect of in ‡ation on real interest rates (the o¢cial rate minus in ‡ation) is shown in Figure 5 . Prior to the crisis real interest rates were largely negative in the crisis countries. After the crisis they peaked in all countries in 2008. In Ireland where they rose to 7 per cent. They also rose sharply in Spain but did not exceed 2 per cent. Throughout the whole period Germany had positive real interest rates. The relation between real interest rates and output may be inferred from Figure 5 by inverting the vertical axis, implying that the lower the real interest rate, the greater is output growth. Taken together this evidence provides strong support for the argument that EMU, with its one-size-…ts-all monetary policy, is likely to have been a major contributor to the crisis due to causing in the crisis countries low real interest rates which encouraged borrowing and led to strong but unsustainable economic growth, a failure of in ‡ation rates to converge, a loss of competitiveness and current account de…cits.
If the ECB is powerless to set a monetary policy stance that is appropriate for all eurozone countries then for EMU to be sustainable there needs to be an o¤setting e¤ect. In principle, …scal policy could be used to achieve this; having given up ones monetary policy one would then have to use …scal policy to compensate. Later we consider whether there might also be a market-based solution. First, we consider the …scal stance of EU countries in recent years.
The Fiscal Stance of EU Countries
The …scal stance of EU countries plus the US is shown in Figure 6 which reports government expenditures, revenues and debt 1999-2012. It is clear that there was a deterioration in the …scal stance of most countries from 2008. This was largely due to rising expenditures as a proportion of GDP, while tax revenues, although falling in absolute terms, were fairly constant as a proportion of GDP. The common factor in this is the fall in GDP as expenditures stayed roughly constant but revenues fell with the fall in GDP.
It is also clear that from the start of EMU none of the crisis countries adopted a tight …scal stance in order to o¤set the expansionary e¤ects of monetary policy. Even prior to the crisis, however, in Greece, Italy and Portugal expenditures exceeded revenues. In Ireland the budget was close to balance, and in Spain revenues exceeded expenditures causing debt to fall, implying that in neither country was the crisis due to excessive government borrowing, but excessive private borrowing. Nonetheless, …scal policy was not used, or su¢cient, to o¤set this. Perhaps one reason why the …scal positions of many of the crisis countries was not a concern prior to the crisis was that strong GDP growth boosted tax revenues. A related question is whether the …scal stance in eurozone countries can be measured and monitored in a meaningful way. Econometric analyses of …scal policy sustainability are based on the assumption the government budget constraint (GBC) must hold in present value terms over the in…nite horizon. This imposes weak restrictions on future …scal policy, but does not provide any relevant policy prescription. Wickens (2011, 2012a) have suggested an index of the …scal stance which addresses this question. Unlike the standard econometric tests of …scal sustainability, the index is suitable for assessing …scal policy in the short and medium term as it can measure whether a government is under-or over-borrowing relative to a pre-speci…ed debt target. It can also quantify the required …scal consolidation needed to achieve that target at any future time horizon.
The index is derived from the (GBC) as a proportion of GDP:
is the real interest rate adjusted for economic growth, with   ,   and   denoting the nominal interest rate on debt, the rate of growth of GDP and the in ‡ation rate respectively. The index of the …scal stance in a speci…c period  measuring the …scal adjustment over the time horizon ,   ( ), is derived from a log-linear approximation about its steady-state value of the n-period ahead solution to the GBC, equation (1). It can be written as
where variables without a  subscript denote steady-state values, ln( +  + ) ¤ is the debt-GDP target to be achieved by period  +  and    + denoting the expectation based on information available in  of the logarithmic equivalent of the future primary de…cit, see Polito and Wickens (2012a) for details. The index therefore measures in period  the ratio of the desired level of the discounted debt-GDP ratio in period  +  to its forecast value. A value of the index equal to, above or below 1 implies that the forecast debt-GDP ratio for period  +  is on, above or below target, respectively. In the latter case, the level of discounted debt-GDP ratio is forecasted to be above its desired value, suggesting that …scal policy is too loose. Only as  ! 1 does the index provide a measure of …scal sustainability in the same sense as the econometric tests, namely, whether the government budget constraint holds in present value terms over the in…nite horizon. The index is plotted for eurozone countries in Figure 7 from 1979-2011 together with 95% con…dence bands under the assumption that …scal policy aims to keep the debt-GDP ratio constant over a 1-year ahead horizon (i.e.  = 1). It is clear from the variability of the index that the …scal stance is not constant through time. All countries show a decline in the ability of governments to meet their debt obligations following the crisis in 2008, re ‡ecting the loss of output mentioned above. Of the crisis countries, Greece, Ireland and Spain show the greatest …scal deterioration. Prior to the crisis Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain had viable …scal stances, but Greece did not. More importantly, the …scal policy adjustments vary over time and from country to country. Achieving the same …scal de…cit as non-crisis countries -as is being proposed -is not su¢cient for the crisis countries. What is required is a country-speci…c …scal policy that o¤sets the expansionary e¤ects of monetary policy.
One possible response is either to reduce expenditures or to raise tax rates. The IMF (2009a IMF ( , 2009b has proposed an ad hoc rule in which 2/3 of the adjustment should be by reducing expenditures (including transfers) and 1/3 should be by raising tax revenues, see Cottarelli and Viñals (2009) . In Polito and Wickens (2012a) we estimate the average annual adjustment in the budget de…cit (%GDP) required to restore the debt-GDP ratio to the pre-crisis 2007 level by 2016 and 2030, based on data up to 2011. Bringing the debt-GDP ratio back to its 2007 level is regarded by the IMF as not only a reasonable goal, but a minimum requirement of any viable strategy for restoring a normal …scal stance, see Cottarelli and Viñals (2009) . The results for the crisis countries are reported in Table 1 . Not only do …scal consolidation plans vary from country to country, they also depend on the required timing of the …scal adjustment. Clearly longer time horizons make …scal adjustments more feasible to achieve. If …scal policy did not o¤set monetary policy in countries where it was inappropriate, did the market do so? As noted, prior to EMU most of the crisis countries faced much higher borrowing costs than they did afterwards as governments could borrow close to the o¢cial ECB interest rate before 2008 and the private sector interest rates were similarly low. In principle, there is no reason why markets shouldn't adjust rates to re ‡ect the risk of default. After the crisis this is precisely what they did, but they failed to do so before. Bond risk premia are usually the result of in ‡ation or interest rate risk rather than default risk, but when bonds are priced in the same currency, and with the same o¢cial interest rate, this sort of risk no longer distinguishes the prices of bonds of individual countries. Short-term (3-month) and long-term (10-year) interest rates for EU countries from 1999-2012 are shown in Figure 8 . It is clear that prior to the crisis there is little di¤erence in the rates charged to eurozone countries. After the crisis long rates rose sharply in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, but not in non-crisis countries. It would therefore appear that prior to the crisis markets did not price in default risk and so did not act to o¤set the o¢cial rates set by the ECB, though they did so after once the crisis occurred.
Credit Ratings
Sovereign credit ratings provide an alternative measure of the market's assessment of default, and hence they could indicate to markets what interest rates to charge. As can be seen in Figure 10 below, with the exception of Greece, all the crisis countries received an investment grade rating and only after the crisis -usually some time after the crisis -were their ratings reduced close to (or to) speculative grade. It would therefore appear that market-based credit ratings did not anticipate the crisis either, rather they were even late in registering the crisis. The three main credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and S&P) have been criticised for their failure to react quickly to the crisis. This applies equally to the credit ratings for the United States and the United Kingdom as to eurozone countries and prompted Polito and Wickens (2012b , 2013a and 2013b to explore the possibility of constructing sovereign credit ratings in a di¤erent way based on readily available …scal data. An advantage of this approach over the …scal stance index reported above is that it doesn't require an arbitrary debt-GDP target, yet processes the same information.
The idea is to forecast the probability that the debt-GDP ratio over a given horizon is likely to exceed the maximum debt-GDP ratio that a country can repay. This probability is then mapped into a credit rating using historical records on credit ratings and default probabilities that was provided by Moody's. The forecasts are based on evaluating the intertemporal government budget constraint whose components are derived from a rolling-window VAR with timevarying volatility. This implies that not just the point forecast of the debt-GDP ratio but also its distribution may change over time thereby re ‡ecting structural change, perhaps due to policy. The debt-GDP threshold is obtained from an open-economy real business-cycle model with distortionary taxation. The threshold can be based either on anticipated future changes in tax policy, or on the maximum revenues that can be generated if unanticipated changes in future tax rates were to occur. The resulting debt-GDP values are referred to as the intertemporal government budget constraint limit (IGBCL) and the …scal limit (FL), respectively. The concept of a …scal limit was …rst introduced by Davig, Leeper and Walker (2011) . Both the tax rates and the debt-GDP threshold are calibrated to each economy and vary over time. The thresholds fall after the crisis due to rising interest rates and so lower the credit rating. Full details are given in Polito and Wickens (2013b) . Here we provide a brief description.
The debt-GDP ratio is forecast using the solution to the GBC compounded ¡periods ahead, equation (1),
The cumulative probability of defaulting within the -period horizon is
 + is the probability of sovereign default by period  + ,  + is the probability of default in period  +  and + + is the default threshold (debt-GDP limit).
The IGBCL derived from anticipated future expenditures and revenues, which are based on existing policy, is
The FL, based on the same expenditures, but now maximizing revenue from labour and capital taxes is
where  max + + is the maximum tax revenue, see Polito and Wickens (2013) . The empricial computation is based on the stationary equilibrium solutions of the two debt limits in equations (2) and (3). In Figure 9 we show the IGBCL, the FL and the current debt-GDP ratio over the period 1995-2012. We observe that both debt limits vary over time; usually then get tighter after 2008. For all countries FL lies above IGBCL, implying that there is room to raise more tax revenues. But the gap is very small for many countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Sweden). This suggests that there is greater scope in these countries for raising their borrowing capacity by reducing expenditures than by increasing taxes. For all countries except Greece and, after 2008, Italy and Portugal, the actual debt-GDP ratio lies below the IGBCL. This implies that for these countries the present value of expected discounted future primary surpluses was large enough to …nance the current level of debt. For Greece this was not the case for the whole period, and the gap widened considerably from 2007. For Italy and Portugal this doesn't hold from 2008, while for Ireland and Spain the gap closes markedly after 2008. Once again, therefore, the evidence points to a failure to tighten …scal policy in the crisis countries prior to 2008, and to a worsening of the …scal stance from 2008. In Figure 10 we report our measure of the credit ratings for a …ve-year horizon based on FL together with the o¢cial historic ratings over the period 1995-2012. The solid line is the new credit rating estimate. While the two ratings are similar for non-crisis countries, they di¤er for the crisis countries. Although the o¢cial credit rating for Greece is several notches below triple-A throughout, our measure of the credit rating is speculative grade from roughly the point at which Greece joined EMU in 2002. Our measure also indicates an earlier downgrade than the o¢cial ratings for all of the other crisis countries. This suggests that the rating agencies appear to have reacted too slowly to the crisis and that a better processing of available …scal data may have prevented this.
Another interesting …nding is that after the crisis the o¢cial ratings for Ireland and Spain are well below our measure, which indicates a much faster recovery. This disparity may re ‡ect the cause of the crisis in these countries being excessive private, and not public, borrowing. Before the crisis both countries received a triple-A rating from the two measures, which is consistent with the previous …ndings that the public …nances were not a potential problem. It is only when the two governments started to bail out their private banks that the historic ratings were downgraded. Our measure, which focuses on the …scal stance, suggests that the underlying position is stronger than the o¢cial ratings allow.
Credit downgrades are feared by governments because markets are more reluctant to hold their debt which causes a fall in bond prices, implying a much higher interest rate on new issues or for rolling over debt. The case of the UK is of interest. Although not in EMU, and so not directly a¤ected by the eurozone crisis, throughout the …nancial crisis the UK received a triple-A o¢cial rating. It was only in February 2013 that the UK was downgraded one notch by Moody's and later by Fitch, in April 2013. Compared with our measure this response to the crisis appears to be too late. Moreover, by 2012, the UK appears to have recovered its triple-A rating. Further evidence of the mis-timing of the o¢cial UK credit rating is given by the spread between Libor and the overnight swap rate (OIS). This is shown in Figure 11 . Although markets did not anticipate the crisis, they clearly responded much earlier than the credit rating agencies, and they reduced the spread much earlier. The correspondence between our measure of the UK's credit rating and this spread suggests that model-based sovereign credit ratings can provide a timely warning and indicate when changes in interest rates are warranted. We have obtained similar …ndings for the United States (Polito and Wickens, 2012b) based on comparing our measure of the US credit rating with credit default swap data. Figure 11 . The spread between LIBOR and UK overnight swap rates
We have suggested that markets might be able to o¤set a monetary policy set for the whole eurozone that is inappropriate for some eurozone countries by adjusting the rates at which these particular countries can borrow from the market. Our analysis in this section suggests that this did not happen prior to the eurozone crisis but, once the crisis occurred, markets did raise rates sharply for the crisis countries; they were back to levels observed prior to the start of EMU. Further, o¢cial credit ratings did not re ‡ect the risk inherent in the …scal stances of the crisis countries, or did so too slowly. Therefore, while markets could, in principle, o¤set the one-size-…ts-all monetary policy of the eurozone, the evidence suggests that, in practice, they failed to do so.
Conclusions
The attention of policymakers has turned to how to deal with the eurozone crisis. Their recommendation is to make drastic changes to the eurozone by creating a …scal union, a banking union and a political union. In this paper we seek to understand how the crisis occurred, and what might be done to avoid similar mistakes in the future, rather than how to clear up after the crisis. In this way it might be possible to avoid making such drastic treaty changes.
Our contention, supported by the evidence we present, is that the underlying cause of the crisis was that monetary policy was too loose in the crisis countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Unlike the …nancial crises in the United States, the United Kingdom, and even Germany and Switzerland, the eurozone crisis was not due the U.S. sub-prime crisis. The reason monetary policy was too loose in the crisis countries was that the one-size-…ts-all monetary policy set by the ECB is based on the eurozone's rate of in ‡ation which is dominated by the rates of in ‡ation of the core countries: Germany, France and the Netherlands. Given its mandate, there is nothing that the ECB can do about this. The crisis countries entered the euro with higher in ‡ation rates than the core countries and, rather than converge to the average eurozone in ‡ation rate, until the crisis, they remained higher. This was because the common interest rate produced a negative real rate in the crisis countries which stimulated excessive private or public borrowing, causing high GDP growth rates and thereby maintaining initial in ‡ation di¤erentials and a loss of competitiveness.
We suggest that there are two possible ways to avoid this intrinsic consequence of having a single currency for independent countries, and hence the need to rewrite eurozone treaties. First, national …scal policy can be used to o¤set an inappropriate monetary policy. For countries with higher than average in ‡ation, this implies having a tighter than average …scal stance. Note that simply aiming to stay within the same (3% of GDP) …scal de…cit limit as other countries -as has been proposed by the European Commission -may not deliver a tight enough …scal stance if in ‡ation is high. In e¤ect, this implies that, having given up one policy instrument (monetary policy), a country then has to commit its other policy instrument (…scal policy) in order to unravel the harmful consequences of receiving in return an inappropriate monetary policy. The main gain for this policy bargain is a …xed nominal exchange rate but, as we have seen, not a …xed real exchange rate. The evidence we have presented both on the …scal stance and on credit ratings indicates that …scal policy was not used prior to the eurozone crisis to o¤set an inappropriate monetary policy, hence the crisis. Nonetheless, it remains a potential solution for the future.
The second possible solution doesn't require any policy intervention. It is based on markets adjusting interest rates to o¤set low o¢cial rates by pricing in sovereign risk. This is what happened after the crisis. The crisis countries have been forced to borrow at much higher rates than before the crisis, rates that are closer to those they faced prior to entering the euro. The evidence, both on borrowing rates and o¢cial sovereign credit ratings, prior to the crisis shows that markets did not anticipate the crisis. A possible reason for this is that traditionally bond prices have primarily re ‡ected price risk rather than default risk. Once the crisis hit, interest rate spreads immediately re ‡ected this. What is needed is that bond prices better anticipate potential default. We have suggested that a possible way to achieve this is via a model-based assessment of sovereign credit ratings based on forecasts of …scal fundamentals. The …ndings are encouraging. Our measure of sovereign credit ratings di¤ers from o¢cial ratings mainly for the crisis countries by better anticipating credit downgrades before the crisis, and upgrades afterwards. This indicates that, although they did not do so before, it might be possible for markets to provide a solution to the inherent problems of a single currency by the better pricing of bonds through taking sovereign default into account, and assessing this from …scal fundamentals.
Finally, although not discussed in this paper explicitly, we note another way that markets can help o¤set monetary policy. We have remarked that the loss of competitiveness that resulted from the price level increases of the crisis countries caused a real exchange rate appreciation and current account de…cits. In the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment, regaining competitiveness would require costs to be kept under control. This entails having competitive labour markets and strong productivity growth which are also market solutions.
